4 of 5 in Book I, Chapter VIII25 of 276 in work
Nobility in Circumstances
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

Using metaphors of a general and a shoemaker, the author illustrates how a truly good person remains resilient and noble regardless of the fortunes they are dealt.

...hey bruise as it were and maim the blessedness: for they bring in positive pain, and hinder many acts of working. But still, even in these, nobleness shines through when a man bears contentedly many and great mischances not from insensibility to pain but because he is noble and high-spirited. And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched, because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean.
For the man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume, becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances, just as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has with him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of the leather which has been given him; and all other good artisans likewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to be: I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into fortunes like those of Priam. Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one hand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary…
and, on the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a little time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during which he has made himself master of great and noble things. Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for acting his part in the drama of life:[35] and this during no ordinary period but such as constitutes a complete life as we have been describing it. Or we must...
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5 of 5 in Book I, Chapter VIII26 of 276 in work
The Complete Life
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle contemplates the definition of a truly happy life, suggesting it requires both virtuous activity and a fitting conclusion to one's existence.

...I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into fortunes like those of Priam. Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one hand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary mischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and, on the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a little time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during which he has made himself master of great and noble things.
Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for acting his part in the drama of life: and this during no ordinary period but such as constitutes a complete life as we have been describing it. Or we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his death must be in keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and Happiness we assume to be in every way an end and complete.
And, if this be so, we shall call them among the living blessed who have and will have the things specified, but blessed as Men.[36] On these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much. Chapter IX. Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally, contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions. But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of ways, and some t...
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1 of 2 in Book I, Chapter XI27 of 276 in work
Now entering Book I, Chapter XI
Excellence as Happiness
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The author links the study of ethics to statesmanship, arguing that the goal of a true leader is to understand human excellence to make citizens good.

...However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia to pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that from what has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the class of things precious and final. And it seems to be so also because of its being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it we all do everything else that is done; now the starting-point and cause of good things we assume to be something precious and divine. Chapter XI.
Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect Excellence, we must enquire concerning Excellence: for so probably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again, he who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most pains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. (For examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians and whatever other such there have been.) But if this investigation belongs properly to πολιτικὴ, then clearly the enquiry will be in accordance with our original design. Well, we are to enquire concerning…
And by Human Excellence we mean not that of man’s body but that of his soul; for we call Happiness a working of the Soul. And if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the Soul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the oculist a knowledge of the whole body, and the more so in proportion as πολιτικὴ is more precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact physicians of the higher class do busy themselves much with the knowledge of the body. So then the statesm...
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2 of 2 in Book I, Chapter XI28 of 276 in work
Reason's Dual Domains
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The author divides the human soul into rational and irrational parts, further subdividing the irrational part into a vegetative state and a desiderative state that can be persuaded by reason.

...we do not. But, it may be, not the less[42] on that account are we to suppose that there is in the Soul also somewhat besides the Reason, which is opposed to this and goes against it; as to how it is different, that is irrelevant.) But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in the man of perfected self-mastery,[43] or the brave man, it is yet more obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason.
So then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely vegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient to it and capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase we say we have λόγος of our father or friends, and this in a different sense from that in which we say we have λόγος of mathematics.) Now that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason, admonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then we are to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as the Irrational, will be twofold,…
pure science, intelligence, and practical wisdom—Intellectual: liberality, and perfected self-mastery—Moral: in speaking of a man’s Moral character, we do not say he is a scientific or intelligent but a meek man, or one of perfected self-mastery: and we praise the man of science in right of his mental state;[45] and of these such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences. BOOK II Chapter I. Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral:[1] now the Intellectual springs orig...
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1 of 4 in Book II, Chapter I29 of 276 in work
Now entering Book II, Chapter I
Virtue Beyond Nature
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The author argues that moral virtues are not innate but are developed through the habituation of our natural capacities.

...science in right of his mental state;[45] and of these such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences. BOOK II Chapter I. Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral:[1] now the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, from teaching (for the most part that is[2]), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term denoting custom in that language.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving themu and are…
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other things, as the arts f...
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