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Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle/340 BCE / Classical Antiquity

FlourishingHabit And CharacterPractical WisdomVirtue

Ethics in the Ancient Greek tradition, oriented around flourishing and habit and character.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a foundational work of ancient moral philosophy, likely compiled from lectures at the Lyceum and addressed to the question of how human beings achieve eudaimonia. It develops virtue ethics through analyses of habit, character, friendship, pleasure, and practical reason.

276 excerpts/117 sections

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Chapters

The structural skeleton of the work

Book I

Book I, Chapter I

4 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Education1 excerpt Epistemology1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Intellectual Rigor1 excerpt Methodology1 excerpt

Experience Before Ethics

Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice and not mere knowledge. And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in temper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct result of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and following each object as it rises. For to them that are such the knowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control: but, to those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very profitable.

Book I

Book I, Chapter II

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Eudaimonia1 excerpt Happiness1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt

Happiness's Elusive Nature

So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who talk grandly and above their comprehension.

Book I

Book I, Chapter III

7 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Ethics2 excerpts Happiness2 excerpts Teleology2 excerpts Analogy1 excerpt Critique Of Forms1 excerpt

The Three Lives

Now of the Chief Good (i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation. Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus.

Book I

Book I, Chapter IV

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Ethics1 excerpt Eudaimonia1 excerpt Finality1 excerpt Happiness1 excerpt Intrinsic Value1 excerpt

Happiness as Ultimate End

And of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further: whereas honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for their own sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also with a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever.

Book I

Book I, Chapter V

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Definition Of Happiness1 excerpt Epistemology1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Excellence1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt

Man's Essential Function

But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action, their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him. Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature without a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and foot, and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special work; so too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work of his own? What then can this be?

Book I

Book I, Chapter VI

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Virtue2 excerpts Action1 excerpt Classification Of Goods1 excerpt Dialectic1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt

Action Over State

And there is perhaps no unimportant difference between conceiving of the Chief Good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere state or as a working. For the state or habit may possibly exist in a subject without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is asleep, or in any other way inactive; but the working cannot so, for it will of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is not the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter the lists, for out of these the prize-men are selected; so too in life, of the honourable and the good, it is they who act who rightly win the prizes. Their life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a mental sensation, and that is to each pleasant of which he is said to be fond: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a sight to him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to him who is fond of justice, and more generally the things in accordance with virtue to him who is fond of virtue.

Book I

Book I, Chapter VII

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Definition Of Happiness1 excerpt Fate1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Happiness's Complete Life

For to constitute Happiness, there must be, as we have said, complete virtue and a complete life: for many changes and chances of all kinds arise during a life, and he who is most prosperous may become involved in great misfortunes in his old age, as in the heroic poems the tale is told of Priam: but the man who has experienced such fortune and died in wretchedness, no man calls happy.

Book I

Book I, Chapter VIII

5 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Virtue3 excerpts Character2 excerpts Resilience2 excerpts Stoicism2 excerpts Eudaimonia1 excerpt

Nobility in Misfortune

And whereas the incidents of chance are many, and differ in greatness and smallness, the small pieces of good or ill fortune evidently do not affect the balance of life, but the great and numerous, if happening for good, will make life more blessed (for it is their nature to contribute to ornament, and the using of them comes to be noble and excellent), but if for ill, they bruise as it were and maim the blessedness: for they bring in positive pain, and hinder many acts of working. But still, even in these, nobleness shines through when a man bears contentedly many and great mischances not from insensibility to pain but because he is noble and high-spirited.

Book I

Book I, Chapter IX

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Book I

Book I, Chapter X

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Book I

Book I, Chapter XI

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Virtue2 excerpts Ethics1 excerpt Happiness1 excerpt Political Science1 excerpt Psychology1 excerpt

Excellence as Happiness

Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect Excellence, we must enquire concerning Excellence: for so probably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again, he who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most pains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. (For examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians and whatever other such there have been.) But if this investigation belongs properly to πολιτικὴ, then clearly the enquiry will be in accordance with our original design. Well, we are to enquire concerning Excellence, i.e. Human Excellence of course, because it was the Chief Good of Man and the Happiness of Man that we were enquiring of just now.

Book II

Book II, Chapter I

4 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Habituation4 excerpts Virtue4 excerpts Character1 excerpt Custom1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt

Virtue Beyond Nature

From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving themu and are perfected in them through custom.

Book II

Book II, Chapter II

5 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Education2 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts Pleasure And Pain2 excerpts Self-Mastery2 excerpts Character1 excerpt

The Golden Mean

It is the nature of such things to be spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and strength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we must use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength as well as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or too small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they cause, increase, and preserve it. Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and Courage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and fears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be rash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains from none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, as do the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of perception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and Courage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state are preserved.

Book II

Book II, Chapter III

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Action1 excerpt Character1 excerpt Habit1 excerpt Integrity1 excerpt Intentionality1 excerpt

Action Over Talk

We are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man by his doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone, would be even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do not perform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter themselves they are philosophising, and that they will so be good men: acting in truth very like those sick people who listen to the doctor with great attention but do nothing that he tells them: just as these then cannot be well bodily under such a course of treatment, so neither can those be mentally by such philosophising.

Book II

Book II, Chapter IV

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Emotions1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Psychology1 excerpt The Mean1 excerpt

The Virtuous Mean

By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such as are followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of which we are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of which we are able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have compassionated; by States, those in right of which we are in a certain relation good or bad to the aforementioned feelings; to having been made angry, for instance, we are in a wrong relation if in our anger we were too violent or too slack, but if we were in the happy medium we are in a right relation to the feeling.

Book II

Book II, Chapter V

4 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Virtue3 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts The Mean2 excerpts Emotion1 excerpt Excellence1 excerpt

The Virtuous Mean

It is moral excellence, i.e. Virtue, of course which I mean, because this it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these there can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what occasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or in other words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue. In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and defect and the mean.

Book II

Book II, Chapter VI

2 excerpts

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Absolute Wrongs1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Excellence1 excerpt Human Action1 excerpt Morality1 excerpt

Virtue as the Mean

Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.” It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean. And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it is the highest state possible.

Book II

Book II, Chapter VII

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Ambition1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt The Mean1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Ambition's Mean

Now there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul as we said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the difference that is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this state having reference to small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour; a man may, of course, grasp at honour either more than he should or less; now he that exceeds in his grasping at it is called ambitious, he that falls short unambitious, he that is just as he should be has no proper name: nor in fact have the states, except that the disposition of the ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are in either extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we call the virtuous character sometimes by the name ambitious, sometimes by that of unambitious, and we commend sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

Book II

Book II, Chapter VIII

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Moral Psychology1 excerpt Relativity Of Virtue1 excerpt The Golden Mean1 excerpt

The Mean's Relativity

Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the way of excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of course all are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes: for just as the half is greater if compared with the less portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states, compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and vice versa. The brave man, for instance, shows as rash when compared with the coward, and cowardly when compared with the rash; similarly too the man of perfected self-mastery, viewed in comparison with the man destitute of all perception, shows like a man of no self-control, but in comparison with the man who really has no self-control, he looks like one destitute of all perception: and the liberal man compared with the stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.

Book II

Book II, Chapter IX

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Correction1 excerpt Discipline1 excerpt Judgment1 excerpt Moderation1 excerpt Pleasure1 excerpt

The Difficulty of the Mean

And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to find the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is not what any man can do, but only he who knows how: just so to be angry, to give money, and be expensive, is what any man can do, and easy: but to do these to the right person, in due proportion, at the right time, with a right object, and in the right manner, this is not as before what any man can do, nor is it easy; and for this cause goodness is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble.

Book III

Book III, Chapter I

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Accountability1 excerpt Agency1 excerpt Choice1 excerpt Circumstance1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt

External Attribution's Absurdity

It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external things instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by them; or, again, to ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base ones to pleasure. So then that seems to be compulsory “whose origination is from without, the party compelled contributing nothing.”

Book III

Book III, Chapter II

2 excerpts

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Culpability1 excerpt Ignorance1 excerpt Intentionality1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt Moral Choice1 excerpt

Remorse Defines Involuntary

Now every action of which ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but that only is involuntary which is attended with pain and remorse; for clearly the man who has done anything by reason of ignorance, but is not annoyed at his own action, cannot be said to have done it with his will because he did not know he was doing it, nor again against his will because he is not sorry for it.

Book III

Book III, Chapter III

1 excerpt

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Definition Of Virtue1 excerpt Emotion1 excerpt Self-Determination1 excerpt

Voluntary Action's Origin

Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason of ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be “that whose origination is in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the action consists.” For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions involuntary, which are done by reason of Anger or Lust.

Book III

Book III, Chapter IV

4 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Moral Choice2 excerpts Agency1 excerpt Character1 excerpt Deliberation1 excerpt Epistemology1 excerpt

Moral Choice's Narrower Scope

Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice, because this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a more decisive test of moral character than a man’s acts are. Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice; and next, sudden actions we call voluntary but do not ascribe them to Moral Choice.

Book III

Book III, Chapter V

3 excerpts

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Moral Choice2 excerpts Autonomy1 excerpt Deliberation1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Governing Principle1 excerpt

Deliberation on Means

So then Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general laws, but still uncertain how in any given case they will issue, i.e. in which there is some indefiniteness; and for great matters we associate coadjutors in counsel, distrusting our ability to settle them alone. Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means to Ends. No physician, for instance, deliberates whether he will cure, nor orator whether he will persuade, nor statesman whether he will produce a good constitution, nor in fact any man in any other function about his particular End; but having set before them a certain End they look how and through what means it may be accomplished: if there is a choice of means, they examine further which are easiest and most creditable;

Book III

Book III, Chapter VI

1 excerpt

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Perception1 excerpt Subjectivity1 excerpt Truth1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

The Good Man's Judgment

The really good is the object of Wish, but to each individual whatever impresses his mind with the notion of good. And so to the good man that is an object of Wish which is really and truly so, but to the bad man anything may be; just as physically those things are wholesome to the healthy which are really so, but other things to the sick. And so too of bitter and sweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges in every instance correctly, and in every instance the notion conveyed to his mind is the true one.

Book III

Book III, Chapter VII

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Agency2 excerpts Character Formation1 excerpt Free Will1 excerpt Habituation1 excerpt Irreversibility Of Habit1 excerpt

Voluntary Vice

Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to attain the habits of these vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the analogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of his hand cannot recall it, and yet it rested with him to aim and throw it, because the origination was in his power.

Book III

Book III, Chapter VIII

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Ethics1 excerpt Free Will1 excerpt Habituation1 excerpt

The Habit's Gradual Formation

But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same sense; for of the actions we are masters from beginning to end (supposing of course a knowledge of the particular details), but only of the origination of the habits, the addition by small particular accessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with sicknesses): still they are voluntary because it rested with us to use our circumstances this way or that.

Book III

Book III, Chapter IX

1 excerpt

Top themes in this chapter

Courage1 excerpt Fear1 excerpt Honor1 excerpt

Fear's Proper Objects

Of course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty, disease, desolateness, death; but not all these seem to be the object-matter of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear is right and noble, and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example, since he who fears this is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he who does not fear it is shameless (though there are those who call him Brave by analogy, because he somewhat resembles the Brave man who agrees with him in being free from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or disease, and in fact whatever does not proceed from viciousness, nor is attributable to his own fault, a man ought not to fear: still, being fearless in respect of these would not constitute a man Brave in the proper sense of the term.

Book III

Book III, Chapter X

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Courage2 excerpts Honor1 excerpt Stoicism1 excerpt Suicide1 excerpt The Golden Mean1 excerpt

Suicide's False Bravery

Dying to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or anything that is simply painful, is the act not of a Brave man but of a coward; because it is mere softness to fly from what is toilsome, and the suicide braves the terrors of death not because it is honourable but to get out of the reach of evil.

Book III

Book III, Chapter XI

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Courage3 excerpts Character1 excerpt Habituation1 excerpt Intent1 excerpt Moral Choice1 excerpt

Sudden Fear's True Test

For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under that which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of mind.

Book III

Book III, Chapter XII

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Courage1 excerpt Honor1 excerpt Mortality1 excerpt Pleasure1 excerpt Teleology1 excerpt

Courage's Obscured End

It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is pleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which happens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant with a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but the receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and blood, and so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these drawbacks are many, the object in view being small appears to have no pleasantness in it.

Book III

Book III, Chapter XIII

4 excerpts

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Moderation2 excerpts Desire1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt Psychology1 excerpt Reason1 excerpt

Pleasure's Pain

Now the man destitute of self-control desires either all pleasant things indiscriminately or those which are specially pleasant, and he is impelled by his desire to choose these things in preference to all others; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment of his objects but, in the very desiring them, since all desire is accompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case this, being pained by reason of pleasure.

Book III

Book III, Chapter XIV

2 excerpts

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Habituation2 excerpts Pleasure Vs Pain1 excerpt Psychology1 excerpt Reason1 excerpt Self-Control1 excerpt

Appetite's Obedience

Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing principle it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after what is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting out of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are great and violent in degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore they ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed to Reason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominate it obedient and chastened. In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders of its educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to those of Reason.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter I

7 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Virtue4 excerpts Honor3 excerpts Altruism2 excerpts Character2 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts

Liberality's Proportional Measure

Now Liberality is a term of relation to a man’s means, for the Liberal-ness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the moral state of the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There is then no reason why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives the less amount, if he has less to give out of.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter II

1 excerpt

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Aging1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt Stinginess1 excerpt

Stinginess's Many Phases

Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is more congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being fond of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has many phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter III

2 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Magnificence2 excerpts Aesthetics1 excerpt Honor1 excerpt Longevity1 excerpt Practical Wisdom1 excerpt

Fitting Magnificence

The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he can see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as we said at the commencement, the confirmed habit is determined by the separate acts of working, and by its object-matter. Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such also are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not great merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be proportionate to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above it: and the Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of honour, this being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it with pleasure and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being Mean.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter IV

7 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Honor2 excerpts Magnanimity2 excerpts Self-Worth2 excerpts Stoicism2 excerpts Virtue2 excerpts

The Great-Minded Silence

Neither is his admiration easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and insolence.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter V

1 excerpt

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Ambition1 excerpt Psychology Of Character1 excerpt Self-Knowledge1 excerpt Self-Worth1 excerpt

Self-Ignorance's Cost

The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the character: because in all cases men’s aims are regulated by their supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want of desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and similarly from external goods.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter VI

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Book IV

Book IV, Chapter VII

3 excerpts

Top themes in this chapter

Anger1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Meekness1 excerpt Moderation1 excerpt Moral Judgment1 excerpt

Anger's Blurry Line

Now, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said before. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that transgresses the strict rule only a little, whether on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed: sometimes we praise those who are deficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the irritable Spirited as being well qualified for government. So it is not easy to lay down, in so many words, for what degree or kind of transgression a man is blameable: because the decision is in particulars, and rests therefore with the Moral Sense.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter VIII

1 excerpt

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Conduct1 excerpt Interpersonal Relations1 excerpt Social Ethics1 excerpt The Mean1 excerpt

The Art of Opposition

As regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts, some men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to giving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their line is to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the other hand, are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the contrary line to these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at all whether they give pain or not. Now it is quite clear of course, that the states I have named are blameable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of which a man will let pass what he ought as he ought, and also will object in like manner.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter IX

3 excerpts

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Honesty2 excerpts Character1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Integrity1 excerpt Moral Character1 excerpt

Truth as Moral State

Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is noble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also in the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth are both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator. We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this would come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain moral state.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter X

1 excerpt

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Refinement1 excerpt Social Ethics1 excerpt Tact1 excerpt

The Gentleman's Jocularity

One quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is characteristic of a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are fit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to: for there are things which are becoming for such a one to say and listen to in the way of Jocularity, and there is a difference between the Jocularity of the Gentleman and that of the Vulgarian; and again, between that of the educated and uneducated man.

Book IV

Book IV, Chapter XI

2 excerpts

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Virtue2 excerpts Character1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Moral Philosophy1 excerpt Psychology1 excerpt

Shame's Conditional Good

And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base. True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases.

Book V

Book V, Chapter I

2 excerpts

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Justice2 excerpts Desire1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Fortune1 excerpt Moral States1 excerpt

Pray for Personal Good

Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of course, with respect to good things, but not of every kind, only those which are the subject-matter of good and bad fortune and which are in themselves always good but not always to the individual. Yet men pray for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that things which are in the abstract good may be so also to them, and choose what is good for themselves.

Book V

Book V, Chapter II

3 excerpts

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Justice2 excerpts Social Ethics2 excerpts Virtue2 excerpts Altruism1 excerpt Character1 excerpt

Perfect Virtue Toward Others

Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as exercised towards one’s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and “neither Hesper nor the Morning-star So worthy of our admiration:” and in a proverbial saying we express the same; “All virtue is in Justice comprehended.” And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice of perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I mean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with their neighbour.

Book V

Book V, Chapter III

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Book V

Book V, Chapter IV

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Book V

Book V, Chapter V

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Book V

Book V, Chapter VI

2 excerpts

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Proportion2 excerpts Distributive Justice1 excerpt Equality1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt

Justice as Equal Mean

If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all must allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just must be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it follows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these to certain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things (that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal, between two, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons. The Just then must imply four terms at least, for those to which it is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two. And there will be the same equality between the terms representing the persons, as between those representing the things: because as the latter are to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not equal they must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source of all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who are equal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not equal those things which are equal.

Book V

Book V, Chapter VII

3 excerpts

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Justice2 excerpts The Mean2 excerpts Arbitration1 excerpt Corrective Justice1 excerpt Equality1 excerpt

Arithmetical Justice

But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that proportion but of arithmetical. Because it makes no difference whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm. And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to equality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the suffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the judge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the gain.

Book V

Book V, Chapter VIII

3 excerpts

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Economics2 excerpts Community1 excerpt Comparison1 excerpt Exchange1 excerpt Money1 excerpt

Proportionate Reciprocity

But in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this Reciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it must be Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, because by proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held together, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or else Reciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no admission to participation which is the very bond of their union.

Book V

Book V, Chapter IX

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Ethics1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt The Golden Mean1 excerpt

Justice as Proportional Equality

Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said to have the aptitude for practising the Just in the way of moral choice, and for making division between, himself and another, or between two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to his neighbour the less share of what is choice-worthy and contrariwise of what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, and in like manner when adjudging the rights of two other men. Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust is excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in violation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and defect because it aims at producing excess and defect;

Book V

Book V, Chapter X

3 excerpts

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Convention1 excerpt Governance1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt Legal Positivism1 excerpt Metaphysics1 excerpt

Law's Injustice Possibility

For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the possibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing between the Just and the Unjust. And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that injustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting unjustly, since by the former we mean giving one’s self the larger share of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly evil. This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern, but Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and therefore of the Equal.

Book V

Book V, Chapter XI

3 excerpts

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Action Theory1 excerpt Agency1 excerpt Character1 excerpt Definition Of Volition1 excerpt Deliberation1 excerpt

Choice's Moral Stain

When again he acts with knowledge, but not from previous deliberation, it is an unjust action; for instance, whatever happens to men from anger or other passions which are necessary or natural: for when doing these hurts or making these mistakes they act unjustly of course and their actions are unjust, still they are not yet confirmed unjust or wicked persons by reason of these, because the hurt did not arise from depravity in the doer of it: but when it does arise from deliberate choice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depraved man.

Book V

Book V, Chapter XII

2 excerpts

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Voluntary Harm's Paradox

The solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly dealt with is not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the knowledge of the person hurt and the instrument and the manner of hurting him, the fact of its being against the wish of the man who is hurt. So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust voluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since no man wishes to be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who really acts contrary to his wish: for no man wishes for that which he does not think to be good, and the man who fails of self-control does not what he thinks he ought to do.

Book V

Book V, Chapter XIII

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Book V

Book V, Chapter XIV

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The Disposition's Difficulty

Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves, and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not really so; to have connection with a neighbour’s wife, or strike one’s neighbour, or give the money with one’s hand, is of course easy and rests with one’s self: but the doing these acts with certain inward dispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one’s self.

Book V

Book V, Chapter XV

3 excerpts

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Equity3 excerpts Justice2 excerpts Character1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Jurisprudence1 excerpt

Law's Universal Defect

And so the Equitable is Just but better than one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but the error which arises out of the universality of statement: and this is the nature of the Equitable, “a correction of Law, where Law is defective by reason of its universality.” This is the reason why not all things are according to law, because there are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law, and so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak generally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also, just as the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this rule shifts according to the form of each stone and the special enactment according to the facts of the case in question.

Book V

Book V, Chapter XVI

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Book V

Book V, Chapter XVII

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Book VI

Book VI, Chapter I

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Reason2 excerpts Definition1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Moderation1 excerpt Practical Wisdom1 excerpt

The Need for Definition

Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning: as, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on which skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course to say that men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little, but in moderation, and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a man had he would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in answer to the question, what are proper applications to the body, he were to be told, “Oh! of course, whatever the science of medicine, and in such manner as the physician, directs.” And so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that this should be true which has been already stated, but further that it should be expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the definition of it.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter II

2 excerpts

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Deliberation1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt Intellect1 excerpt Moral Action1 excerpt Moral Choice1 excerpt

The Past's Unchangeable Nature

But nothing which is done and past can be the object of Moral Choice; for instance, no man chooses to have sacked Troy; because, in fact, no one ever deliberates about what is past, but only about that which is future, and which may therefore be influenced, whereas what has been cannot not have been: and so Agathon is right in saying “Of this alone is Deity bereft, To make undone whatever hath been done.” Thus then Truth is the work of both the Intellectual Parts of the Soul; those states therefore are the Excellences of each in which each will best attain truth.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter III

1 excerpt

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Epistemology1 excerpt Eternity1 excerpt Knowledge1 excerpt Necessity1 excerpt

Knowledge of Necessity

What Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances. For we all conceive that what we strictly speaking know, cannot be otherwise than it is, because as to those things which can be otherwise than they are, we are uncertain whether they are or are not, the moment they cease to be within the sphere of our actual observation. So then, whatever comes within the range of Knowledge is by necessity, and therefore eternal, (because all things are so which exist necessarily,) and all eternal things are without beginning, and indestructible.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter IV

1 excerpt

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Aesthetics1 excerpt Ontology1 excerpt Philosophy Of Action1 excerpt

Art's Domain of Making

Now all Art has to do with production, and contrivance, and seeing how any of those things may be produced which may either be or not be, and the origination of which rests with the maker and not with the thing made. And, so neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor things in the way of nature, come under the province of Art, because these are self-originating. And since Making and Doing are distinct, Art must be concerned with the former and not the latter.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter V

2 excerpts

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Ethics1 excerpt Moral Psychology1 excerpt Phronesis1 excerpt Practical Wisdom1 excerpt Teleology1 excerpt

Deliberation Without Rules

It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself, not in any definite line, as what is conducive to health or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call men Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some good end in a case where there is no definite rule. And so, in a general way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be Practically Wise.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter VI

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Book VI

Book VI, Chapter VII

1 excerpt

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Science's Intuitive Foundation

Science must mean the most accurate of all Knowledge; but if so, then the Scientific man must not merely know the deductions from the First Principles but be in possession of truth respecting the First Principles. So that Science must be equivalent to Intuition and Knowledge; it is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most precious objects, with a head on. I say of the most precious things, because it is absurd to suppose πολιτικὴ, or Practical Wisdom, to be the highest, unless it can be shown that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the Universe.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter VIII

3 excerpts

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Experience2 excerpts Deliberation1 excerpt Education1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Knowledge Vs. Action1 excerpt

The Good in Counsel

Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most peculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor about any save those that have some definite End and this End good resulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the name of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in the way of calculation has a capacity for attaining that of practical goods which is the best for Man.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter IX

2 excerpts

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Deliberation vs Intuition

Knowledge it obviously is not, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring and calculating. Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of reasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and it is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been resolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.

Book VI

Book VI, Chapter X

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Book VI

Book VI, Chapter XI

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Book VI

Book VI, Chapter XII

9 excerpts

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Wisdom's Moral Eye

Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it without this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul (as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness, as we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms into which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major Premiss, “since —— is the End and the Chief Good” (fill up the blank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the Form, so that anything will do), but how this blank should be filled is seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision and causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles. It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise, without being a good, man.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter I

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Book VII

Book VII, Chapter II

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Knowledge's Powerlessness

Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control. That he can so fail when knowing in the strict sense what is right some say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought, that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should master him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended generally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as that of Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what is best conceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is best.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter III

4 excerpts

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Knowledge vs Opinion

For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with deliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure as it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think that he ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same. Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in contravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference to the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have no doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge; if then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than men who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as having but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not differ in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own Opinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge: Heraclitus is a case in point.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter IV

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Character1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt Passion1 excerpt Temptation1 excerpt

The Hidden Danger

We should say that man is more entirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little, urged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is very strong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he had the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain consequent on the want of those pleasures which we have denominated necessary?

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter V

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Book VII

Book VII, Chapter VI

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Anger's Misguided Reason

In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason but mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark at the slightest stir, before they have seen whether it be friend or foe; just so Anger, by reason of its natural heat and quickness, listening to Reason, but without having heard the command of Reason, rushes to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some impression on the mind shows there is insolence or contempt in the offender, and then Anger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as the case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of it: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does not and is therefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control his anger yields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to Reason at all.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter VII

2 excerpts

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Forms of Self-Control

Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy and Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have made resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others are led by passion because they have never formed any resolutions at all: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselves beforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the approach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution, yield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant or somewhat painful.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter VIII

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Self-Control's Fixed Core

The man of Self-Control does not change by reason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will be easy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call of Reason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led by their pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated, the Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure and pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of victory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained when their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they rather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of Self-Control.

Book VII

Book VII, Chapter IX

14 excerpts

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Divine Simplicity's Pleasure

The reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is that our nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something different from itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that one part of this nature be doing something, this something is, to the other part, unnatural: but, if there be an equilibrium of the two natures, then whatever is being done is indifferent. It is obvious that if there be any whose nature is simple and not complex, to such a being the same course of acting will always be the most pleasurable. For this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is always one, i.e. simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, and Pleasure resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter I

2 excerpts

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Ethics1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt Political Philosophy1 excerpt Social Cohesion1 excerpt

Friendship Over Justice

Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, and legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical. Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required; but, on the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of Friendship.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter II

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Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter III

2 excerpts

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Perceived Good as Friendship

It seems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to himself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object of Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It comes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what is but for that which conveys to his mind the impression of being good to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that which is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this impression to the mind.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter IV

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Friendship of Utility

So then they whose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend beloved is but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These Friendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not beloved in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage or pleasure as the case may be. Such Friendships are of course very liable to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the others cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no longer pleasurable or useful.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter V

3 excerpts

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Friendship of Goodness

That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish one another’s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter VI

2 excerpts

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Human Nature2 excerpts Companionship1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt Intercourse1 excerpt Pleasure1 excerpt

Friendship's Distance

Distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it has been said, “many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse destroy.” Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter VII

3 excerpts

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The One True Friend

To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is, so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy, which is very difficult. But it is possible to please many on the score of advantage and pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may be rendered in a very short time.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter VIII

4 excerpts

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Stability in Friendship

Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their friends in so doing. The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for a short time from taking delight in one another’s wickedness.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter IX

2 excerpts

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Friendship2 excerpts Justice2 excerpts Community1 excerpt Moral Hierarchy1 excerpt Social Duty1 excerpt

Friendship's Common Goods

It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends, for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb, “the goods of friends are common,” since Friendship rests upon Communion.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter X

3 excerpts

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Political Philosophy2 excerpts Analogy1 excerpt Corruption1 excerpt Despotism1 excerpt Domestic Life1 excerpt

The King's True Purpose

From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the nonce. But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter XI

2 excerpts

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Friendship2 excerpts Justice2 excerpts Human Connection1 excerpt Humanity1 excerpt Political Philosophy1 excerpt

Friendship's Justice Requirement

In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave quâ slave, because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an inanimate slave.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter XII

2 excerpts

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Community1 excerpt Division Of Labor1 excerpt Family1 excerpt Kinship1 excerpt Marriage1 excerpt

Marriage as Partnership

Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of procreation but also with a view to life in general:: because in this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what is peculiar to each into the common stock.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter XIII

4 excerpts

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Moral Obligation2 excerpts Utility2 excerpts Conflict1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt

Advantage Friendship's Faults

But the Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding; because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they are being done. It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not in the same line of Friendship.

Book VIII

Book VIII, Chapter XIV

2 excerpts

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Duty1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Filial Piety1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt Gratitude1 excerpt

Friendship's Proportional Return

Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect according to his ability. For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is always a debtor.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter I

3 excerpts

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Character1 excerpt Economics1 excerpt Education1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt Gratitude1 excerpt

Friendship's Shifting Grounds

These cases occur because the Friendship of the lover for the beloved object is based upon pleasure, that of the other for him upon utility, and in one of the parties the requisite quality is not found: for, as these are respectively the grounds of the Friendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up because the motives to it cease to exist: the parties loved not one another but qualities in one another which are not permanent, and so neither are the Friendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character of the parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as we have already stated.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter II

2 excerpts

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Community1 excerpt Duty1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Filial Piety1 excerpt Justice1 excerpt

Claims of Different Relationships

In short, as has been oftentimes stated before, all statements regarding feelings and actions can be definite only in proportion as their object-matter is so; it is of course quite obvious that all people have not the same claim upon one, nor are the claims of one’s father unlimited; just as Jupiter does not claim all kinds of sacrifice without distinction: and since the claims of parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors, are all different, we must give to each what belongs to and befits each.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter III

3 excerpts

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Friendship3 excerpts Virtue2 excerpts Deception1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Human Relationships1 excerpt

Friendship on False Grounds

Now surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or pleasure there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when they no longer have those qualities; because they were friends [not of one another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it is only reasonable to expect that they should cease to entertain the sentiment. But a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being really attached to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be so because of his moral character: in fact, as we said at the commencement, the most common source of quarrels between friends is their not being friends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves to be.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter IV

5 excerpts

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Altruism1 excerpt Consistency1 excerpt Definition Of Friendship1 excerpt Depravity1 excerpt Identity1 excerpt

The Good Man's Self-Sympathy

Furthermore, the good man wishes to continue to live with himself; for he can do it with pleasure, in that his memories of past actions are full of delight and his anticipations of the future are good and such are pleasurable. Then, again, he has good store of matter for his Intellect to contemplate, and he most especially sympathises with his Self in its griefs and joys, because the objects which give him pain and pleasure are at all times the same, not one thing to-day and a different one to-morrow: because he is not given to repentance, if one may so speak.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter V

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Book IX

Book IX, Chapter VI

1 excerpt

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Friendship1 excerpt Social Harmony1 excerpt The Common Good1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Unity Among the Good

Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also said to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and relating to life. And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards themselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the expression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are steady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is just and expedient and aim at these things in common. The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they can be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they do unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and service for the common good: and while each man wishes for these things for himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do not watch over the common good it is lost.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter VII

3 excerpts

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Altruism1 excerpt Creativity1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Existence1 excerpt Honor1 excerpt

Creator's Love

And this is the case also with artisans; every one, I mean, feels more affection for his own work than that work possibly could for him if it were animate. It is perhaps specially the case with poets: for these entertain very great affection for their poems, loving them as their own children. It is to this kind of thing I should be inclined to compare the case of benefactors: for the object of their kindness is their own work, and so they love this more than this loves its creator. And the account of this is that existence is to all a thing choice-worthy and an object of affection; now we exist by acts of working, that is, by living and acting; he then that has created a given work exists, it may be said, by his act of working: therefore he loves his work because he loves existence.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter VIII

5 excerpts

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Ethics2 excerpts Self-Love2 excerpts Virtue2 excerpts Courage1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt

Self-Love as Virtue

Now all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest about honourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect of the καλὸν, and be intent upon doing what is most truly noble and honourable, society at large would have all that is proper while each individual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtue being assumed to be such. And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but the bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his neighbours by following low and evil passions.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter IX

4 excerpts

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Friendship3 excerpts Happiness3 excerpts Contemplation1 excerpt Existence1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt

Friend as Second Self

Now to perceive that one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing naturally good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of things naturally good being pleasant. Therefore the fact of living is choice-worthy, and to the good specially so since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they receive pleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in itself is good. But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a name for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choice-worthy to each so too, or similarly at least, is his friend’s existence.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter X

1 excerpt

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Friendship1 excerpt Intimacy1 excerpt Love1 excerpt Social Limits1 excerpt

Friendship's Natural Limit

Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but so many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not to be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and, for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same time: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one object: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards whom they are felt. And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time become friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships of the kind are between two persons: whereas they who have many friends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be friends really to no one except in the way of general society; I mean the characters denominated as over-complaisant.

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter XI

2 excerpts

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Adversity1 excerpt Altruism1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Friendship1 excerpt Human Connection1 excerpt

Share Joy, Spare Sorrow

It would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily on occasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to others: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with reluctance; for we should as little as possible make others share in our ills; on which principle goes the saying, “I am unfortunate, let that suffice.” The most proper occasion for calling them in is when with small trouble or annoyance to themselves they can be of very great use to the person who needs them. But, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one’s friends in their misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is the friend’s office and specially towards those who are in need and who do not demand it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasant to both);

Book IX

Book IX, Chapter XII

1 excerpt

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Moral Growth1 excerpt Nature Of Existence1 excerpt Shared Experience1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Friendship's Shared Pursuits

And whatever in each man’s opinion constitutes existence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they choose life, herein they wish their friends to join with them; and so some men drink together, others gamble, others join in gymnastic exercises or hunting, others study philosophy together: in each case spending their days together in that which they like best of all things in life, for since they wish to be intimate with their friends they do and partake in those things whereby they think to attain this object. Therefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being unstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being made like to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growing with their intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeated acts, and by mutual correction, for they receive impress from one another in the points which give them pleasure;

Book X

Book X, Chapter I

1 excerpt

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Human Nature1 excerpt Integrity1 excerpt Theory Vs Practice1 excerpt

Hypocrisy's Corrosive Effect

In matters respecting men’s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts: whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience, they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for instance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the credit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it was, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.

Book X

Book X, Chapter II

4 excerpts

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Epistemology2 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts Virtue2 excerpts Excellence1 excerpt Intellectualism1 excerpt

Pleasure's False Crown

There are many things also about which we should be diligent even though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them. It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy in themselves, differing in kind, i.e. in the sources from which they are derived.

Book X

Book X, Chapter III

1 excerpt

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Metaphysics1 excerpt Nature Of Pleasure1 excerpt Time1 excerpt

Pleasure's Timeless Wholeness

An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete its whole nature. Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say; and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for this reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time of certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish;

Book X

Book X, Chapter IV

6 excerpts

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Excellence2 excerpts Attention1 excerpt Ethics1 excerpt Focus1 excerpt Habituation1 excerpt

Pleasure's Productive Power

The Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit, because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves also specifically different.

Book X

Book X, Chapter V

1 excerpt

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Happiness1 excerpt Leisure1 excerpt Teleology1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Amusement as Rest

Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is absurd of the End being amusement, and of one’s toiling and enduring hardness all one’s life long with a view to amusement: for everything in the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view, except Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to take pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish and very childish: but to amuse one’s self with a view to steady employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for amusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour continuously. Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to Working afterwards.

Book X

Book X, Chapter VI

6 excerpts

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Contemplation4 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts Happiness2 excerpts Human Nature2 excerpts Reason2 excerpts

The Divine Within

But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine compared with man’s ordinary life. Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.

Book X

Book X, Chapter VII

1 excerpt

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Happiness1 excerpt Human Nature1 excerpt Moderation1 excerpt Virtue1 excerpt

Happiness with Moderation

So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity, because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds. However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may act in accordance with Virtue.

Book X

Book X, Chapter VIII

8 excerpts

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Education3 excerpts Ethics2 excerpts Habituation2 excerpts Law2 excerpts Political Science2 excerpts

The Limits of Words

Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains;