2 of 2 in Book VIII, Chapter XII212 of 276 in work
Marriage as Partnership
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The author argues that marital friendship is a natural law based on the human tendency to pair for both procreation and the practical division of labor in life.

...there is in that of Companions, and more in the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as they are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can therefore depend most securely upon the trial.
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of procreation but also with a view to life in general:: because in this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what is peculiar to each into the common stock.
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union. The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) one friend with another...
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1 of 4 in Book VIII, Chapter XIII213 of 276 in work
Now entering Book VIII, Chapter XIII
Friendship Without Blame
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The text explains that conflict arises in utility-based friendships, whereas friendships based on goodness are characterized by mutual kindness and a lack of fault-finding.

...ople who are alike in goodness, become friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the superiority of the other party.
Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find fault with his…
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding; because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the requirements are cont...
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2 of 4 in Book VIII, Chapter XIII214 of 276 in work
Advantage Friendship's Faults
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The text analyzes why friendships based on utility are prone to conflict, noting that disputes arise when parties have different expectations regarding the moral or legal nature of their obligations.

.... And suppose that one of the two exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party. Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him.
But the Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding; because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they are being done. It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of…
The Legal is upon specified conditions, either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a quid pro quo. In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit must be content to abide...
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3 of 4 in Book VIII, Chapter XIII215 of 276 in work
The Legal vs Moral
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The passage distinguishes between legal friendship, which is based on explicit agreements and exchanges, and moral friendship, which is based on trust and the expectation of informal reciprocity.

...ind fault because though justly entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they are being done. It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not in the same line of Friendship.
The Legal is upon specified conditions, either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a quid pro quo. In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue. That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he expects to…
Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at least, wish what is honourable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a mistake originally...
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4 of 4 in Book VIII, Chapter XIII216 of 276 in work
Honor vs Profit
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics

The text advises that when one receives a benefit from someone who is not a disinterested friend, one should still attempt to make a proportionate and willing return.

...no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue. That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.
Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at least, wish what is honourable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend of a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act disinterestedly;
one should therefore discharge one’s self of the obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same understanding one may accept it or not. A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to mea...
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