Shame's Conditional Good
Aristotle
Nicomachean EthicsAristotle argues that shame is not a virtue for a good man, as a virtuous person should never voluntarily commit the disgraceful acts that cause shame.
...h as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause Shame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all belong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor does it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful really, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be done, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame. In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of a faulty character.
And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base. True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases.
And, granted that impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is base, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such things and feel Shame. Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state: however, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book. BOOK V Chapter I. Now the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are, what kind of actions are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean state Justice is, and betwe...
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